by Redazione
Iran now stands at a decisive crossroads: either a profound revision that restores the primacy of the national state, the interests of the citizen, and good neighborly relations—or a continued trajectory toward deeper isolation, exhaustion, and exposure.
By Dr. Nidal Shoukeir
Professor of Strategic Communications and Governmental Relations
Today, the Islamic Republic is experiencing one of the most critical moments since the regime came to power in 1979. It is a moment where deep structural internal crises intersect with escalating external pressures—most notably the ongoing Israeli and American strikes. This moment starkly exposes the cost of strategic choices accumulated by the regime over more than four decades, pushing both the state and society to the brink of political, economic, and security suffocation.
At such a pivotal juncture—one that may well mark a new chapter in Iran’s modern history—it is necessary to pause and reflect on what can be described as the regime’s “sins,” which have led this resource-rich and strategically positioned country into its current predicament. This is especially pertinent given that the regime has ruled Iran with iron and fire since the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on February 11, 1979, ending centuries of monarchical rule.
The Sin of State-Building: From the Dream of a Modern State to the Reality of a Closed Regime
Perhaps the most fundamental sin of the Iranian regime lies in its failure to build a genuine modern state. When the Shah fell, Iranians aspired to a national state founded on social justice, the rule of law, and respect for human dignity—a state that would be the antithesis of repression, poverty, and underdevelopment. These aspirations were both simple and legitimate, and many placed their hopes in the new religious leadership to fulfill them.
Yet the path taken by the regime, despite its grand promises and revolutionary slogans, led to the opposite outcome. Iranians soon found themselves under a closed authoritarian system governed by an ideological–sectarian structure and dominated by networks of power shielded from any real accountability.
In many respects, the post-revolutionary Iranian state became more repressive and inward-looking than the Shah’s regime. Freedoms were crushed—most notably women’s rights—and the country was politically and culturally sealed off from the world. This dramatic shift produced a profound identity crisis: a rigid ideological identity imposed by the regime clashing with Iran’s rich, diverse national identity. This structural ambiguity generated duality in decision-making, contradictions in priorities, weakened state resilience, and transformed institutions into instruments of control rather than service and development.
A Captured Economy: When Development Is Subordinated to Ideology
The second major sin was the subjugation of Iran’s economy to ideological and security imperatives. Instead of investing in sustainable development, education, scientific research, and infrastructure, resources were diverted to parallel institutions and internal and external networks directly linked to unelected centers of power.
The irony is that Iran is a historic and wealthy nation, endowed with vast oil and gas reserves and immense human capital—more than capable of becoming a stable and advanced country. Yet these resources were not used to uplift the nation. Instead, large portions were funneled abroad under the banner of “exporting the revolution” and supporting regional proxies, impoverishing the domestic sphere and triggering crippling international sanctions.
While sanctions undoubtedly exacerbated the crisis, the core of the problem lies in mismanagement, lack of transparency, and the dominance of unaccountable institutions over the national economy. The result has been unmistakable: declining living standards, widespread unemployment, the erosion of the middle class, and an Iranian citizen forced to pay the price for strategic choices in which he had no say.
Destructive Power over Defensive Capability
Logically and strategically, the Iranian regime should have invested in building a modern national defensive force capable of protecting Iranian territory and deterring external threats. Instead, its third sin was an excessive investment in destructive tools at the expense of developing a comprehensive defensive system.
Rather than strengthening air defense, protecting infrastructure and cities, the regime prioritized ballistic missiles, drones, and the construction of military arms beyond its borders. This approach gave Iran a capacity for intimidation, disruption, and the creation of temporary regional crises—such as threatening waterways and civil aviation—without providing real deterrence or effective self-defense.
Recent military developments have laid bare the fragility of this strategy. Iran appeared unable to protect its airspace, vital facilities, or senior military and security figures—including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenai—from precise operations carried out by Israel and the United States. This reality raises a fundamental question: where did all those military investments go?
Hostility toward the Gulf States: Zeroing Friends
The deepest sin in this series of failures lies in the regime’s chronic and unjustified hostility toward its Gulf neighbors. Since its inception, the Iranian regime has viewed its Gulf environment as a threat rather than a partner, seeking to undermine regional security instead of building cooperation and stability.
The Gulf model—characterized by stability, prosperity, and modernity—posed a profound embarrassment to the Iranian leadership and raised a painful internal question: why can Iran not resemble its Gulf neighbors?
Despite this, Gulf states repeatedly extended their hands to contain Iran and stabilize the region, even striving at various stages to shield Tehran from military confrontation and open negotiation channels with Washington. The outcome, however, was another unforgivable sin: sending hostile military and political messages toward Gulf capitals at moments of extreme regional sensitivity.
In this context, the diplomatic adviser to the UAE President, Dr. Anwar Gargash aptly stated:“Iran’s aggression against the Gulf states has missed the address and isolated Iran at its most critical moment. Your war is not with your neighbors. This escalation only reinforces the narrative that Iran is the primary source of regional instability, and that its missile program remains a permanent title of insecurity.”
In sum, what Iran is experiencing today cannot be reduced to external pressures or temporary military confrontations. It is the natural outcome of accumulated strategic sins in state-building, economic governance, military doctrine, and relations with neighbors. From its inception, the Iranian regime chose to govern by ideology rather than by statecraft, by confrontation rather than interest, and by dominance rather than partnership—only to find itself today isolated, devoid of regional depth or genuine sympathy.
History repeatedly shows that regimes do not collapse merely when attacked from the outside, but when they lose the ability to listen to their people, insist on reproducing their mistakes, and refuse to acknowledge that the age of slogans has ended.
Iran now stands at a decisive crossroads: either a profound revision that restores the primacy of the national state, the interests of the citizen, and good neighborly relations—or a continued trajectory toward deeper isolation, exhaustion, and exposure. This is not a political prophecy, but the distilled lesson of history itself.
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L’articolo Nidal Shoukeir, The sins of the Iranian regime! proviene da Associated Medias.
